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preface
This Master's Thesis addresses the question, "Was
William Edward Burghardt DuBois a pragmatic philosopher
in the strictest sense?" In answering the question this
writer has had to refer to the traditions of philosophic
speculation as stated in coherence, correspondence, and
pragmatic theories. The historical trends of past civil-
izations, which were brought to bear upon the conditions
of economies and politics faced by the nations of the
Renaissance period, and which lead directly to the New
World slave trade of the fifteenth century, had to be
examined. In addition the history of the Afro-American
upon the North American continent had to be researched.
The need to address these wide ranging areas is based
upon my claim that the statement made in 1900, "The prob-
lem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-
line," is DuBois' evaluation of information gathered in
studying periods of world civilizations. Western European
societial growth, and the history of the Black man.
Since the answers, i.e. answers to the questions which
must be settled if the problem of the color-line is to be
solved, are of great importance, I suggest in this Thesis
that the question, "What is true?" is an appropriate first
question. The discipline by which the question is addressed.
IV
and thus answered, will, in turn, inform all answers which
that researcher offers. Throughout the work of W.E.B. Du-
Bois, we note that he continually turned his attention to
the question, "What is true?". it is the central issue of
this Thesis that the discipline, which was demonstrated
by DuBois in addressing the question, is pragmatic and that
DuBois was a pragmatic philosopher.
The work contained in the following pages is original
except where necessarily cited. The suggestions and com-
ments, concerning earlier drafts of this Thesis, made to
me by the members of the Committee, have been candid, per-
spicacious and welcomed. However, the final decision for
revision and editing has remained with this writer, and
this writer is responsible for mistake or foible found.
I here offer special and heartfelt thanks to the Committee
Chairman, Gareth Matthews, for his quiet, yet demanding,
manner; his patience in the reading of even the very first
beginnings of this project.
v
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CHAPTER I
THEORIES OF TRUTH
(The remarks which are contained in this Chapter
present a formal discussion of three well known theories
of truth, i.e. coherence, correspondence, and pragmatic
theories. There is no reference made to W.E.B. DuBois
accepting or denying any one, all, or a part of these
theories. The discussion which follows is intended to
suggest that if there are alternative formulations within
a theory of truth, then, perhaps, there may be a
formulation of that same theory which has yet to be
discussed
.
)
Prominent among theories of truth are these:
1) coherence theories;
2) correspondence theories;
3) pragmatic theories.
To be sure this list could be further extended. Remarks
addressed to these theories of truth may best serve the
later examination of what I take to be W.E.B. DuBois'
theory of truth. Common to these theories is the attempt
to state the conditions under which a statement is true.
I shall first present remarks addressing coherence theory.
Coherence Theory
Generally speaking the coherence theorist says that
to say of a statement that it is true is to say that that
statement coheres with a system of other statements. For
example, it might be the case that a diamond is hard;
however, the statement that it is hard, if it is true, and
only if it is true, must cohere with the rest of my state-
ments. Historically Leibniz, Spinoza and Hegel have been
credited with positions of importance in philosophy because
of their attempts to construct formal systems which would
1
2give insights into the nature of truth and the principles
of philosophy. All three have been credited, but not without
dispute, to be coherence theorists. (These metaphysicians
are of particular interest to this paper for they were read
and studied by DuBois, e.g. 1889-1890 DuBois was enrolled in
George Santayana's course offered at Harvard entitled:
Philosophy 6 - Earlier French Philosophy, from Descartes to
Leibniz, and German Philosophy from Kant to Hegel.) These
metaphysical supporters of a coherence theory suggest, in
various ways, that the truth of a statement comes to be known
from the nature of reasoning which assumes that the statement
is known a priori. To this end Leibniz offered his 'Monadology'
which suggested that the past, present and future of any
individual substance cohered within a system of "pre-
established" harmony. Leibniz claimed that "every individual
substance expresses the whole universe in its manner and in
its full concept are included all its experiences together
with all attendant circumstances and the whole sequence of
exterior events."'*' Within such a system wherein individual
substances cohere according to a pre-established harmony,
or, alternatively, within a system which claims the coherence
of all is in the composition of one substance, there seems
to be little need to be concerned with temporal experience
and reality. Yet a coherence theory does need to offer more
than a set of mutually consistent statements if it is to
provide a comprehensive theory of truth. If the statements
3Oj_ experience are to cohere within a system of statements,
then there is a connection of meaning and truth between the
statements of experience and statements which may be known
a priori. I shall examine this point from two perspectives.
First, I address the following question, "What are the
consequences, as concerns statements of experience, when a
coherence theory depends upon a set of statements know a
priori?" An immediate result is that a statement of empirical
findings may be rejected, not because it fails to cohere with
other statements of experience, but rather because it fails
to cohere with statements which are independently accepted
to be true, i.e. a priori known. An example of this is the
statement, "The sun is the center of our immediate celestrial
system," which, in spite of its crudeness of expression, is
surely true. The statement, however, was denied during
Galileo's time in favor of the claim that the earth was that
center. The denial of the statement, 'the sun is the center
of the movement of the celestrial bodies most immediate to
us', was based upon the accepted statements whose truths were
asserted to be known a priori.
The second point to be discussed is this: that even if
statements of necessary truth and statements of contingent
truth cohered, problems would arise when the distinction
between the coherence of meaning and truth of contingent
statements is compared to the meaning and truth of necessary
truths. As a question it might read, 'what is the basis for
4the claim that there is a connection of meaning and truth
between the statements of experience and statements known
a priori?
' There is a closeness in the relationship between
the meaning and truth of a priori statements in mathematics
which is necessarily not transferable to the relationship
which holds between meaning and truth of statements of
experience. The relationship of the former is one in which
the statements, e.g. two is greater than one. are true in
virtue of the meaning of the words. It is because the
meanings of the words are internally related as they are that
this statement, given as an example, is true. Consider,
however, the truth of the statement, 'A 360° double slam-
dunk requires more ability than a one handed lay-up.' The
truth of this statement is not dependent upon the relation-
ship of statements known a priori
,
i.e. the truth does not
depend upon the meaning of the terms '360° double slam-
dunk' and 'one handed lay-up' being a priori known. But
perhaps the most expedient means of addressing these worries
generated by the coherence theory is to discuss the coherence
theory's definition of truth. This definition should then
detail the conditions by which a statement may be asserted
to be true, i.e.
(1) x is true =df x coheres with other
statements or a maximal set of statements.
By definition, a statement is true if, and only if, it
coheres within a system. What, it may be asked, are the
conditions required within this system for a statement to
5be true? Perhaps the system requires the statement to cohere
with other judgments. The advantage of such a system, as
compared to a system which would admit only statements which
are known a priori, is that the meaning and truth of state-
ments are claimed to be analytic. But to assert that analytic
statements are true because they cohere with one another,
and that they are true because of what the world is like, is
not to speak to the meaning of truth. Thus the statement,
'A diamond is hard', is true if it coheres within a system
of statements. These statements, which make up the whole
conjunctively, may state facts, but for them to cohere they
must state facts which tell us how things are in similar
cases. The system which admits the statement, 'A diamond
is hard, ' suggests a coherence based upon empirical evidence
that the objects which bear the predicate 'is hard' are
resistant to scratches. Then this same system would also
include the statement that water is hard. Water too is
resistant to scratches but these statements, if true, state
facts but make reference to two different types of cases.
And similarly we would find that statements which state
facts about the sum of the angles of a triangle would cohere
in spite of their assertions about different cases. Take
the following as an example, 'the sum of angles in a triangle
drawn on a plane is 180°', while 'the sum of the angles of
a triangle created by the intersection of three great circles
may be as large as 270°,'
6The coherence theory of truth claims that truth consists
in coherence, i.e. truth is the coherence of one statement
with another within a system. That there may be several
systems which within themselves have statements which cohere
but that those same systems do not cohere with one another
is another of the worries directed against this theory. An
additional worry rests with the criterion by which a state-
ment is said to cohere with some other statements. If one
were to argue that statements are true in virtue of the
statements' coherence with facts, this would be to move
beyond the theory presently considered. However, if one
were to argue that the coherence of one statement to another
is accepted as a practical test of truth, this could be
asserted only because there was at least one statement
judged to be independently true. Thus the coherence theory
provides some insight into the difficulty of asserting
statements of the form "x is true" with any assurance, but
the theory settles few of the questions which address the
conditions by which a statement may be claimed true.
Correspondence Theory
When we turn the discussion from the coherence theory
to a correspondence theory, we seek again the conditions
by which this theory determines that a statement is true.
Historically the correspondence theories have suggested that
there is a correspondence between thought and reality of
7which the truth consists, i.e. there is a truth relationship
between belief and fact. The early worry generated by the
Schoolmen's theory of correspondence may be summarized as
follows. The Schoolmen claimed that a statement is true
when, and only when, the thing is as signified . 2 If a
thing is claimed which is not so, then it is falsely claimed.
Conversely, if a thing is claimed which is so, then it is a
ture claim. As a result the true claim is understood to be
directed to "what is" and a false claimed directed to "what
is not". A correspondence theory by this may then suggest
that the truth of a statement is upheld or is defeated by
the relationship which the statement of belief holds to
fact. But a false or erroneous statement of belief on this
first account suggests that to think of, or to have a thought
of, what is not is to think of or have a thought of nothing,
i.e. it would be just not to think or just not to have a
thought. This correspondence theory may be revised by
claiming that there is a relationship which exists between
beliefs, and mistaken beliefs, and facts. The support which
this revision offers to the theory is of two types. On the
one hand there is a category which allows objective facts
and objective falsehoods to be the objects of beliefs and
false beliefs respectively. Additionally, this provides
that there may be two statements, i.e, ". , . is", and,
"
... is not", w7hich may be said to correspond with each
fact of which only one is true. These modifications
8nonetheless offer little to clarify satisfactorily the
criteria by which the definition of "x is true" corresponds
to the facts of which the beliefs are held. For example,
the truth of the statement '4 + 4 = 8, 1 stands outside
the belief held of the statement, and the truth of the
relationship between the belief and fact is not dependent
upon the statement. Bertrand Russell has addressed this
separation and distinction in saying, "the world contains
facts
,
which are what they are whatever we may choose to
think about them, and that there are also beliefs, which
have reference to facts, and by reference to facts are
3
either true or false".
A formulation of the correspondence theory's definition
of truth may be presented as follows:
(2) x is true =df there is some fact, f,
such that f, corresponds to x.
The correspondence suggested by this formulation is that
which holds between a statement and fact. This relation-
ship of a statement corresponding to fact either holds or
it doesn't. "A diamond is hard" in this interpretation
asserts that 'a diamond is hard' is true, if, and only if,
there is a fact that corresponds to this statement, pre-
sumably the fact that a diamond is hard, (Clearly this is
distinct from the coherence theory claim in which the truth
of the statement did not presuppose, nor did it attempt to
correspond to, a fact, such as the fact asserted by the
proposition that a diamond is hard. Rather the coherence
9theory only demanded that the statement cohere within some
system.) However, an effective way of showing that the
correspondence relationship, asserted by formulation (2)
of the correspondence theory's definition of truth, is not
clear is to demonstrate that the theory is not relieved of
the worries which arise from the liar paradox as presented
in the Epimenides ' example. Consider the sentence "This
sentence is not true." Is it true? If it is, then it is
not; if it is not, then it is.^ Formulation (2) seems to
continually fall victim to this paradox for it asserts
that a particular relation, the relation of correspondence,
holds between any true sentence, and only true sentences,
and something real. If it is the case that what we know
about an object of the real world is a fact, then it is in
this regard that a fact is that peculiar kind of thing which
mediates knowledge. Thus to say that 'x is true' is to
make an assertion about a proposition. It is a proposition
which is spoken of as 'expressing a fact' and facts are
expressed and regarded as a case of knowledge. Herein the
correspondence theory runs a rough course. This may be
highlighted by the following discussion.
The statement of which 'true' is predicated by the
correspondence theory, is defined as
(2) x is true =df there is some fact, f,
such that f corresponds to x.
We might then ask of the statement, what is the nature of
the relation 'corresponds'? Does the statement correspond
10
with an object of perception or does it correspond with
an object which has independent existence apart from thought?
What is the nature of the relation of a statement and fact?
Is fact a conceptual object of existence within the mind or
is fact an object which has existence without the mind?
To define fact in the following manner,
(3) x is a fact =df there is a statement,
s, such that x corresponds to s,
does not aid us in our search. In this definition fact is
defined in terms of its corresponding with a statement
when it was 'a statement' which was problematic in the
definition (2)
.
We either must give up this theory which
provides these definitions or modify the theory in some way.
Semantic Concept
An alternative and modified theory which may give some
insight into the limitations or strengths offered by the
correspondence theory is the "semantic concept of truth".
The worry which the semantic theory addresses is that if
the definition of truth, as presented by the correspondence
theory, is to hold, it necessarily must avoid the problems
entailed by contradiction and antinomies. The correspondence
theory has suggested that a sentence is true if that
sentence corresponds to a fact, viz. a fact is that
peculiar kind of abstraction which is expressed by a
proposition. The semantic conception of truth suggests
11
that the criterion, for the material adequacy of the
definition of truth, must reflect the equivalence which
holds between a sentence, which we shall render as 'p', to
which the word "true" refers, and the name of that sentence
which is expressed by the sentence 'x is true'. Here I
shall introduce the statement, x is true if, and only if,
p. This is called, in Tarski's paper 'The Semantic
Conception of Truth", "equivalence of the form (T)". 5 (l
do not believe that this creates a problem for • p • is
equivalent by definition, to some fact f, such that f
corresponds to x.) Tarski claims that the equivalence of
the form (T) serves as a partial definition of truth, i.e.
"it explains wherein the truth of this one individual
sentence consists. The general definition has to be, in
a certain sense, a logical conjunction of all of these
partial definitions."^ Thus the equivalence form, sug-
gested by the semantic theory, seems to accord with the
definition of truth offered by the correspondence theory:
"A diamond is hard" is true if, and only if,
a diamond is hard.
The use of the word "true" here is in keeping with the
semantic use of the term, i.e, it expresses a relation
between a certain expression and the object referred to by
the expression. However, the criterion of material
adequacy, by which we asserted the equivalence relation
which holds between a name of a sentence and the sentence,
12
is clearly not stringent enough to avoid the unwanted re-
sults of the liar paradox. If, in appreciation of an
example used by Tarski, we take 'c' to be the replacement
of the sentence typed on page 12 of this paper, line 6
from the top, we may consider the following:
(a) c is not a true sentence.
We have been informed of the meaning of ' c' so we may
claim
(b) 'c is not a true sentence' is identical
with c.
As suggested by the equivalence of the form (T)
,
we have
(c) 'c is not a true sentence' is true, if, and
only if, c is not a true sentence.
The statements expressed by (b) and (c) yield the contra-
diction
(d) c is true if, and only if, c is not a true
sentence
.
This undesirable consequence can be seen to influence
examples presented earlier, e.g. a diamond is hard:
(e) 'A diamond is hard' is true if, and only
if, a diamond is hard.
But our notion of "what is true" must embrace all cases
and not just specific cases of our own choosing. It
might be that we believe we understand the statement, 'a
diamond is hard' is true if, and only if, a diamond is
hard, because of the familiarity we have with the words
used. It would seem that if the equivalence of the form
(T) is sufficient, then we should be able to substitute any
13
sentential variable in place of the expression 'a diamond
is hard' where it occurs. But can a natural language be
used to assert the true about itself? One test might be to
try and quantify into a statement:
(f) (p) (
*
p
'
is true if, and only if, p)
But this is of little assistance for though the quantifier
ranges over p in the statement, we do not know what the
value of ' p ’ is. Furthermore, when we consider that for
the statement 'a diamond is hard', 'p' is true if, and
only if, a diamond is hard, 'p' may designate anything,
including the sixteenth letter of the alphabet. We get
little accomplished if we attempt to add other quantifiers
to range over the statement. The problems we have encoun-
tered are based upon the requirement demanded by the
equivalence of the form (T)
.
Form (T) requires us to have
a name of some sentence to take the place of x in the
expression 'x is true'. The equivalence of the form (T)
meets no problem as long as the sentence, which is in-
dicated by the given name of a sentence, is denoted. When
we attempt to be general rather then specific the formula-
tion fails, e.g. (f) above. The semantic theory, which
is used here to modify the correspondence theory of truth,
results in reflecting the limits of description which a
natural language possesses. Within the semantic theory
the sentence is restricted to an expression of the natural
language and the problematic terms, such as 'correspondence'
14
and 'fact', are relieved of their burdens, for with use of
the form (T)
,
the sentence, and thereby its name, must
be known
.
Pragmatic Theory
In brief the remarks so far presented have suggested
that a coherence theory of truth claims the truth of a
statement can only be asserted if that statement is
consistent to and ascertained by its relations to other
statements whose truth are accepted. The correspondence
theory of truth claims that the truth of a statement can
be asserted only when the statement claiming a certain fact
refers directly to that fact and in all ways represents that
fact. The last theory of truth to be presented here is a
pragmatic theory of truth. The discussion of a pragmatic
theory of truth will briefly present two formulations:
( 4 ) x is true =df x will prove itself good
to be believed;
^
and
,
( 5 ) x is true =df x is fated to be ultimately
agreed to by all who investigate.®
The first formulation of a pragmatic definition of the
true, ( 4 ) , is offered as one with which William James would
hold. The second formulation of the pragmatic definition
of the true is offered by Charles Peirce. The point of
common beginning which is shared by these two definitions
is the search both philosphers undertook in determining
15
the origin of the term "pragmatism".
The generally accepted notion of pragmatism is that it
is a philosophical trend closely tied to the investigation
of and the recognition of that which is "practical".
William James remarks that the history of the idea shows
that pragmatism is a term derived from the same Greek word
/
meaning action, from which our words 'practice' and
'practical' come. Peirce, however, who is recognized as
the originator of what has become the modern pragmatic
theory, in a 1905 article, "What Pragmatism Is", presented
the following account of what he had taken to be pragmatism's
Kantian origin:
Some of his (Kant’s) friends wished him to
call it practicism or practicalism ....
But for one who had learned philosophy out of
Kant, as the writer, along with nineteen out of
every twenty experimentalists who have turned to
Philosophy, had done, and who still thought in
Kantian terms most readily, praktisch and
pragmatisch were as far apart as the two poles,
the former belonging in a region of thought
where no mind of the experimentalist type can
ever make sure of solid ground under his feet,
the latter expressing relation to some definite
human purpose. Now quite the most striking
feature of the new theory was its recognition
16
of an inseparable connection between rational
cognition and rational purpose: and that
consideration it was which determined the
preference for the name pragmatism
.
10
Upon these two historically based descriptions of the
derivation of the term 'pragmatism' rests, in part, the
reason for the two pragmatic theories of truth presented
above. One other introductory note is of service. This
concerns the discussion which revolved about Peirce's
statement of the "principle" of pragmatism, alternatively
called the "pragmatic maxim". This maxim, according to
Peirce, was intended to "furnish a method for the analysis
of concepts. . . . The method prescribed in the maxim is to
trace out in the imagination the conceivable practical
consequences - this is, the consequences for deliberate,
self-controlled conduct - of the affirmation or denial of
the concept, and the assertion of the maxim is that herein
lies the whole of the purport of the word, the entire
concept
.
Pragmatic Maxim
The whole function of thought is to
produce habits of action. ... To develop
its meaning, we have, therefore, simply
to determine what habit it produces, for
what a thing means is simply what habits
17
it involves.
. . . what habit is depends
on when and how it causes us to act. As
for the when
,
every stimulus to action is
derived from perception; as for the how
,
every purpose of action is to produce some
sensible result. Thus we come down to
what is tangible and conceivably practical,
as the root of every real distinction of
thought, no matter how subtle it may be; and
there is no distinction of meaning so fine as
to consist in anything but a possible dif-
1 7ference of practice. . .
I will discuss the impact of this "pragmatic maxim"
upon the work of William James shortly. But first I will
address the definition of truth which is associated with
James. It would seem that the discussion of James's
pragmatic theory of truth should not harp on how his defi-
nition truth relied on subjective and expedient criteria.
That James was aware of the vulnerability of such a position
and would not accept such a position is expressed by him
as follows:
Truth ... is manifestly incompatible
with waywardness on our part. Woe to him
whose beliefs play fast and loose with the
order which realities follow in his experi-
ences; they will lead him nowhere or else make
13false connections.
. . . What immediately feels most 'good'
is not always most 'true' when measured
18
by the verdict of the rest of experience.14
James's defense of his position, that he recognized the
pragmatism of his description was open to charges which
he had recognized and attempted to avoid, is given support
by Bruce Kuklick. Kuklick says the claims lodged against
James's subjective element, i.e. a criterion of truth is
the truth an individual believes to be correlated with
fact, are lessened when it is stressed that James claimed
truth not to be defined in respect of an individual but
truth as an "inevitable regulative postulate - the for-
ever satisfying for all, the truth proved satisfactory
for all in the long run." James's notion of the
expedient was not that that which was claimed to be true
was that which seemed most directly to answer to or
correlate to a fact, rather the expedient for James was
that which lead most directly "to an actual merging of
ourselves with the object (of the maximal conceivable
truth in an idea)
,
to an utter mutual confluence and
identification. "16
The basic point which needs to be understood in the
discussion of truth in respect to James is his claim that
there is a correlation between belief and action. Belief
(a term within which is also subsumed the notions of idea
and hypothesis) is an instrument of action, and its truth
19
consists in its verification, i.e. in having the experiences
that the belief predicts we will have, A true belief is
verified by a truth process of specific involvement. Herein
it seems as if the truth process allows individual subjec-
tive evaluation. Upon a closer reading the truth process
is recognized to be a means by which verification and
validation of true belief is asserted when an individual
has not the time nor opportunity to embark personally on
the truth process as concerns each and every belief. "You
accept my verification of one thing. I yours of another.
We trade on each other's truth. But belief verified
concretely by somebody are the posts of the whole super-
structure."^ A true belief by this description does not
come to be, does not come to exist only upon verification
by somebody. James claims that the objects of true belief
virtually pre-exist when every condition of their real-
ization is present, i.e. every condition except that of
being the experiencer who verifies.
Until established by the end process,
its quality of knowing that (i.e. to know
a belief is "for certain") or indeed of
knowing anything could still be doubted;
and yet the knowing really was there, as
the result now shows. We were virtual
knowers of the (Memorial) Hall long before
we were certified to have been its actual
20
knowers, by the precepts retroactive
validating power.
^
To evaluate these points of explication presented by
James in his own support, I shall turn to the formulation
of what is presented by James as a definition of the true:
x is true =df x will prove itself good to
be believe.
Using a statement presented earlier in this paper, then,
the belief held that a diamond is hard is good to be
believed. That this is so is because this belief is
1) verified or verifiable in our experience
or in the experience of others;
2) consistent with our previous beliefs;
3) answerable to a demand of "elegance" or
"economy" (i.e. it has answered to Ockham's
Razor)
.
Point (2) stated above needs only a few words of clarifi-
cation. James claimed that in the verification of a belief
the truth-process had to be loyal to and mindful of the past
true beliefs held by our ancestors. (I will have more to
say about this notion in the later discussion of James and
DuBois.) The ancestral connection is here claimed by James
because he understood the term "usefulness" in this context
demanded of a true belief that in its proving itself good
to be believed, that belief could not contradict residual
beliefs held in the past. James makes here the commendable
suggestion that the residual beliefs with which the more
recent verified true beliefs must correlate are those
21
beliefs of the past which are themselves true by verifica-
tion .
A question which now can be asked of the "truth-
process" and its allegiance to past true beliefs is this:
Can a true belief of the past be lost forever bv its
being presently verified to be false?" James would
answer that the true belief of the past can be now veri-
fied to be false. In one respect this "mutability of
truth" presents an alternative to dogmatism which is based
upon a claim of the absoluteness or immutability of truth:
The great assumption of the intellectualists
is that truth means essentially an inert static
relation. When you've got your true idea of
anything, there's the end of the matter.
You're in possession? you know; you've ful-
filled your thinking destiny.
.
,19
Thus for James a belief is a true belief which proves
itself good to be believed because it allows of itself
constant reflection and, if in our reflection, a retro-
spective judgment asserts that there is a belief which is
true, despite the judgments of the past thinkers, the
belief verified by our own experience sheds a "backward
light" upon the past.
Whatever are the benefits gained by suggestion of
"mutability of truth", the benefits are short-lived, for
the notion seems to be counterintuitive. The notion most
22
often associated with true belief suggests that the truth
of such a belief is time— independent
, If I am presented
^®r the first time a figure of three sides whose three
interior angles, when added together, total 180 °, I may
then say, "It is now true for me that this figure present
before me is a triangle." But the temporal reference
marked by the word 'now', does not require that if I
were the first to have discovered and announced the
properties of triangularity then that truth would have
just come to be true. Nor would the truth of the figure's
being a triangle be changed if I were to correct the
mistaken assertion, offered by others who preceded me,
that that same figure was a square. The true, as presented
by James, is the sum total of all verified and verifiable
beliefs. The parting of the pragmatic theories offered by
James and Charles Peirce is marked at this point: James
suggests that individuals participate in making beliefs
true by specific reference to verified and verifiable
individual experiences? Peirce does not agree.
It would appear that James has interpreted the
"Pragmatic Maxim" to require a definition of the true to
reveal the True's practical and relative effects. The
relevant protion of the Pragmatic Maxim, which James
took to support his interpretation, reads:
Thus, we come down to what is tangible
and practical as the root of every real
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distinction of thought, no matter
how subtle it may be; and there is
no distinction of meaning so fine as
to consist in anything but a possible
difference of practice. 2 0
By linking his interpretation of this portion of the Prag-
matic Maxim to this claim that the term "practical" is de-
rived from classical Greek origins fpfyp* viz
.
practice, the
step to the formulation of a definition reflecting the his-
torical tie between practical and relevant is a short one.
A true belief has associated with it specific actions as
indicated by specific sensible effects . This for James also
leads to his notion of "good"
,
for the action associated with
the true belief involves the achievement of specific effects
through the consistency of behaviorial responses, i.e. ex-
perience :
Truth means nothing but this, that ideas become true
just in so far as they help us to get satisfactory
relation with other parts of our experience . 21
But the Jamesian definition for the true falls short of
clearly presenting criteria by which the true belief may
be asserted. The confusion arises by James, on the one
hand, claiming that true beliefs are constructs of
historical development forming "one great stage of
equilibrium in the human mind's development. ... We
plunge forward into the field of fresh experience with
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the beliefs of our ancestors and we have made already;
these determine what we notice; what we notice determines
what we do; what we do again determines what we experience;
so from one thing to another, still the stubborn fact
remains that there is a sensible flux, what is true of
it seems from the first to last to be largely a matter of
22our own creation." On the other hand, the truth
which is a matter of our verification of belief by
experience conflicts without resolution with the true
beliefs which cannot be verified and, so, on Jamesian
ground are not true beliefs, e.g. "All true beliefs are
verified as pragmatism requires." The truth of this
statement, assuming James's pragmatic criteria, would
demand that the statement be verified. Yet it seems
impossible to achieve such verification,
I now turn to an alternative formulation of the
Pragmatic Theory of Truth which is offered by Charles
Peirce. The definition reads;
x is true =df x is fated to be ultimately
agreed to by all who investigate.
Of initial interest is Peirce's distinction of the forum
within which the truth of a true belief is investigated.
The citation of "all who investigate" presented in the
definition is not a non-descript group but rather a
community composed of scientific researchers. These
scientific researchers seek in their investigations to
eliminate the "ignorance and error which distinguish our
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private selves (individual self consciousness) from the
absolute ego of pure apperception ." 23 Peirce claims that
that which is true belief does not exist independently of
thought and that true belief is not dependent upon what
or how we think. Rather a true belief is independent of
all that is arbitrary and individual in thought. As a
result the intellectual construct which is the result of
information and thought is a definite form, the true, which
would be arrived at by any other mind under sufficiently
favorable conditions. "Different minds may set out with
the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investi-
gation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one
and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which
we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained
goal, is like the operation of destiny." 2 ^ The truth, as
discussed by James, had borne the suggestion of its being
mutable; the truth for Peirce is that which is universal.
For Peirce true, which is itself an intellectual construct,
is immutable, viz. the "unmoving form to which human thought
flows," The real and the true for Peirce are the last
products of human action and were simultaneous in their
realization
:
The truth is the opinion which is fated
to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate
;
and
,
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The real . . . is that which, sooner or
later, information and reasoning would
finally result in ... 25
The distinction between the Jamesian and Peircean
theories of truth can be now highlighted. James claimed
that the truth of an idea is not a stagnant property
inherent in it. "Truth happens to an idea. It becomes
O £
true, is made true by events." To the contrary Peirce
claims that the truth of an idea is the intellectual
construct which encourages us to regard sense appearance
as signs of what is ultimately real . What is ultimately
real demands that there be a regularity which would account
for the differing relations of the real. The regularity
of the general behavior evidenced under all conceivable
circumstances is the meaning of an intellectual concept.
The Pragmatic Maxim, as interpreted by James, suggested
that individual sensations determine what an intellectual
concept/construct is. Thus the truth of a belief is
determined by the sensations expected from it and the
reactions prepared directed towards it. The Pragmatic
Maxim as intended by Peirce leads to analysis of that
which is the mode of being of an object as an intellectual
concept/construct, i.e, a universal. Against James, Peirce
charges, "The sedulous exclusion from the method prescribed
in the maxim of all reference to sensation is specially
to be remarked ."
27 The statement, "A diamond is hard" is
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true belief when the subject of predication would behave in
a certain general way, that is, "it would be true under
given experiential circumstances, taken as they would occur
exPerience • " Thus the true belief is a belief which is
caused by the real. The truth of the belief, that "A diamond
is hard", can be claimed when a final opinion, the result
of application of scientific method to belief, is obtained.
That "a diamond is hard" is to claim
that in an experimental situation if
the hardness was applicable to the
subject 'diamond', then the operation
of presenting a scratch test upon the
diamond would produce the result that
the diamond would not be scratched.
The description of the experimental situation just presented,
joined to the Peircean definition of truth raises questions
about the adequacy of claims against the Peircean theory.
One may as Peirce, "What gives the scientific method the
certainty upon which the quest for truth, in your system is
based?
"
In asmwering this question Peirce perhaps would argue
the following. The term 'fated', as used within the
definition of the true, is not to be confounded with a
suggestion of mysticism. That which is 'fated' in this
respect is that which, if scientifically investigated, is
bound to happen and cannot be avoided. Scientific
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investigation demands situations of confirmation and testing.
Each situation of confirmation and testing must be done
with clearly stated boundaries which insure that all the
recordable habits which are associated with an intellectual
concept are recorded. This is required to avoid the un-
desirable results of, for example, testing mercury and
finding that it too fails the "scratch test". Without the
boundaries specified within scientific investigation then,
like a diamond is hard, i.e. would not be scratched, so
too would mercury be hard. However, in spite of such stated
boundaries, those who investigate do not come to know with
certainty that a given belief is true. Rather it is the
recognition of the role of human error that leads Peirce to
introduce the doctrine of "fallibilism. " Fallibilism, if
correctly incorporated within scientific investigation, will
move human opinion closer to a closer approximation of the
truth only. Fallibilism requires a "confession of inaccuracy
and one-sidedness" be incorporated within a belief statement.
"This is an essential ingredient of truth."
Truth is that concordance of an abstract
statement with the ideal limit towards
which endless investigation would tend
to bring scientific belief, which con-
cordance the abstract statement may possess
by virtue of the confession of its inac-
curacy and one-sidedness, and this
29
confession is an essential ingredient
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of truth.
Fallibilism offers scientific investigation, i.e. the
organized pursuit after truth, parameters within which
belief statements can be measured to move closer to that
which is fated to be believe. Fallibilism also requires a
confession of the inaccuracies or one-sidedness associated
with results of testing. By so stating the inaccuracies
of investigation the end state of the infalliable is never
confused with that which is ultimately moving towards that
end. Just how the confession is to be incorporated within
a given statement of belief is not clearly presented, but
perhaps it might be done as follows:
The statement, "A diamond is hard", I
have found to be true when a diamond is
tested for "scratchability " under all
conditions of temperature and pressure
which our laboratory skills have made
available to us.
The benefit of the belief qualified by the confessional is
that in the experimental situation within which the inac-
curacies are lessen progressively, so too does the degree
to which the belief accords with truth increase. Thus
this process brings the investigator toward the real, the
intellectual construct, fated to be the end of investigation.
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The consideration of these remarks does not settle the
question of how certainty in this method of scientific
investigation can be claimed beyond other methods. If
there are endless investigations which can be looked for-
ward to in one course of inquiry, such as scientific
investigation, can it be that there are as many possible
courses of inquiry available to us as there are number of
investigations within one possible course? Do all such
courses need to be engaged in to be carried to that which
we are fated to believe? Do all such courses of investi-
gation, and the ends reached through an infinite number of
steps available to each, converge at the same fated belief;
the same fated conceptual reality?
Had Peirce offered his definition of "the true ' 1 as
itself true, the questions just listed would raise important
doubts. In the face of such questions the Peircean could
perhaps answer by saying that ’x is true belief if, and
only if, x is fated to be ultimately agreed upon by all who
investigate 1 is not claimed to be a true belief; nor does
the Peircean claim that upon endless investigation by all
who are so engaged will arrive at and agree to it. Rather
'x is fated to be ultimately agreed upon by all who investi-
gate’ is a description of the kind of conditions to which
that concept of truth applies.
I do not say that it is infallibly
true that there is any belief to which
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a person would come if he were to carry
his inquires far enough. I only say
that that alone is what I call truth,
I cannot infallibly know that there is
any truth
.
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CHAPTER II
DUBOIS AND HARVARD'S GOLDEN AGE
(The discussion presented in Chapter I suggests that,
from the time of the earliest philosophical discussions to
the present dialogue, discussion concerning theories of
truth make-up a large and rich body of literature within
philosophy. I shall now consider a theory of truth as
developed within the writings of William Edward Burghardt
DuBois
.
)
DuBois and Truth
An explicit philosophic discussion of DuBois' theory
of truth was not detailed in any one of DuBois' works
. Rather
his theory was developed by necessity within related areas
of academic inquiry, i.e. sociology and history. Nonethe-
less DuBois' theory of truth was firmly based in early and
intensive study of philosophy in Harvard University 1888-
1892, These are the years during which 'pragmatism' was
an important subject of dialogue between two of pragmatism's
early formulators
,
Charles Peirce and William James. We
should also note that the association between DuBois and
James, begun at Harvard, was to last, with personal meetings
and an exchange of correspondence, until James's death in
1910. The period of DuBois and James's most intimate con-
tact, 1888-1892, is the midway point of what Bruce Kuklick,
in The Rise of American Philosophy , calls the "Golden Age
at Harvard". Thus, because of this Harvard connection, and
the close personal association between DuBois and James,
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this subject of DuBois
' theory of truth promises to be of no
small interest. DuBois 1 ideas about truth may have impor-
tance beyond their being his personally formulated concepts.
It is possible that in addition to Peircean pragmatism and
Jamesian pragmatism, another pragmatic theory was developed
and nurtured within the same environment, at the same time,
and bearing fruit from mutual dialogue. This would include
DuBois' pragmatic theory of truth.
We have evidence of DuBois' long term interest and
work which address the notion of truth. In a January 10,
1956, letter written by the then eighty-seven year old
DuBois to his literary executor, Herbert Aptheker
,
DuBois
states
:
. . . it was in search of answers to
the fundamental problems which you
(Aptheker) discuss that I went to
Harvard .... I determined to go
to the best university in the land
and if possible in the world, to
discover Truth, which I spelled with
a capital.
For two years I studied under
William James while he was developing
Pragmatism- under George Santayana and
his attractive mysticism and under
Josiah Royce and his Hegelian idealism,
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I then found and adopted a philosophy
which has served me since.
. . . Several
times in the past I have started to form-
ulate it (DuBois
'
philosophy) but met
such puzzled looks that it remains only
partially set down in scraps of manuscript.
I gave up the search of "Absolute" Truth;
not from doubt of the existence of reality,
but because I believe that our limited
knowledge and clumsy methods of research
made it impossible now completely to
apprehend Truth. I nevertheless firmly
believed that gradually the human mind and
absolute and provable truth would approach
each other nearer and nearer and yet never
in all eternity meet. I therefore turned
to Assumption - scientific Hypothesis. I
assumed the existence of Truth since to
assume anything else or not to assume was
unthinkable. I assumed that Truth was only
partially known but that it was ultimately
largely knowable, although perhaps in part
forever Unknowable. Science adopted the
hypothesis of a knower and something known.
The Jamesian Pragmatism as I understood it
from his lips was not based on the "usefulness"
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of a hypothesis but on its workable
logic if its truth was assumed,'*'
This letter raises two questions: What material within
DuBois' papers gives support to the claim that he began to
formulate and note his "adopted" philosophy? What supports
his claim that Jamesian Pragmatism was based "on its work-
able logic" if the truth of a hypothesis was assumed? To
begin formulating an answer to these questions, we may turn
to DuBois 1 1389 thesis written for James’s Philosophy IV
course. The work entitled, "The Renaissance of Ethics:
A Critical Comparison of Scholastic and Modern Ethics,"
DuBois' senior thesis, "The Renaissance of Ethics",
is given some attention in The Art and Imagination of W.E.B,
DuBois by Arnold Rampersad. Preliminarily to this discus-
sion Rampersad offers an insightful discussion of DuBois'
Harvard experience. Specifically Rampersad in some detail
outlines the generation of DuBois' philosophic exposure
(in thought and personality) while at Harvard, Of the
thesis prepared by DuBois for James, in Philosophy IV,
Rampersad states;
"The Renaissance of Ethics" is by
no means a mature work, . . , certain
passages show an unsure grasp of his
material. . . . These passages do not
invalidate the general honesty or
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seriousness of DuBois
'
paper. Its
thesis revealed his current approach
to that aspect of philosophy which most
interested him: efficacious duty.
. .
The basic determination for the individual
is the exploration of the difference bet-
ween the best possible world and the worst
possible world. Thus, DuBois argued,
the debate over ethics was teleological
in nature. The question of duty depended
on the resolution of the cause and purpose
of life, an identification James applauded.
DuBois had replaced the notion of the
Summum bonum
,
identical with God in
scholasticism, with the notion of a
relativistic prime force whose existence
was arrived at by an empirical process
that avoided transcendental categories.
DuBois moved toward the distinction that,
"What was needed was recognition of a
clear distinction between science and
ethics. The mixture of science, meta-
physics, and ethics needed to be dissolved
into twin streams of science and tele-
ology, The former would lead to what
DuBois called Truth, the latter to ethical
o
theory
.
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It is appropriate at this point to address the claim
that Rampersad uses to introduce this discussion, i.e.
that "The Renaissance of Ethics" is by no means a mature
work. It is true that "certain passages show an unsure
grasp of his material", if we take the marginal notes
written in James's hand to be accurate in their points of
criticism. But it may also be accurate to claim that those
areas of academic discussion highlighted by James are not
the sole areas with which DuBois was most interested. For
on pages 26-27 of the thesis we find this exchange between
DuBois and James,
DuBois: "Act" says Martineau and his
school "in accordance with the highest
motive," which is but a subjective state-
ment of the scholastic "Seek the Highest
Good," a rule which, to anyone having
faith in certain teleology, is as ultimate
as possible. Lately however, with
Professors James and Royce, a variation
of this comes in: another attempt to
base ethics upon fact - to make it a
science . This theory may be so stated:
the attempt to unify goods and find a
summum bonum is fruitless and impossible:
there is therefore no summum bonum and
one must strive to realize all that
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anyone anywhere calls Good.
James adds a note which is directed
by drawn line to DuBois
'
phrase, "to make
it a science", which reads: "I doubt
whether we do seek to make it a science -
to me that seems impossible."
The exchange noted in the passage above raises an
issue concerning the maturity of the work. The teacher/
pupil relationship, which has been a subject of great
interest within philosophy, holds a place of importance
here. This relationship is especially important when the
student wishes to protect the teacher from what the student
suspects is a weakness in an argument or a claim made by
the teacher which the student considers vulnerable. Can
we find within DuBois' remarks, hints that he hoped to
modify James's position so that criticism, which undoubtedly
would surface, might either be deflected or prepared for?
I believe we can find such hints within this thesis. To
begin we might turn to DuBois ' claim that science would
bring fresh perspective to an "understanding of truth".
This suggests a marked departure from James's belief that:
ideas become true in so far as they help
us to get into satisfactory relation with
other parts of our experience, to summarize
them and get about them by conceptual short-
cuts . . . any idea that will carry us
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prosperously from any one part of our
experience to any other part, linking
things satisfactorily, working securely,
simplifying, saving labor; is true for
just so much, true in so far forth,
true instrumentally ... So some new
idea mediates between the ancient stock
of old opinions and the new experience
and runs them into one another most
felicitously and expediently
. . . This
new idea is then adopted as the true one.
It marries old opinion to new fact so as
ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum
of continuity,
^
The DuBois and James Separation
DuBois’ claim that "science would bring fresh per-
spectives to an understanding of eternal truth" was devel-
oped within the climate of Harvard University, James was
the Harvard professor who had the greatest influence upon
DuBois, and those years, in which he was involved with James,
were clearly years of great intellectual activity for James,
James’s activities included intensive work and thought in
both psychology and philosophy. It should be remembered
that in the late nineteenth century the studies of psych-
ology and philosophy, though separate, were not unfamiliar
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to one another and in some instances shared the same class-
room. For example, the question of 'the will', and how it
was central in the disputes of the determinists and indeter-
minists was central to the psychologist as well as the
philosopher
. The discussion between these camps greatly
involved James. However, by the time DuBois joined the
Harvard student body and then enrolled in James's Philosophy
IV, James clearly was in the midst of this philosophical
speculation. The interplay between these academic areas of
interest, i.e. psychology and philosophy, can be seen in
James' efforts to resolve a conflict between the deterministic
assumptions of the science of his day and the indeterministic
assumptions of ethics. James wanted the rigors of the
scientific discipline to aid in his search for Truth, but
he needed the assurance that he sought after science of his
own free will. James sought to assure himself that he was
the agent of his own decision making. His attempts to arrive
at a resolution of these conflicting notions led to the
development of Jamesian Pragmatism, These attempts at
resolution were to generate the split between the prag-
matism as presented by James and the pragmatism as offered
by Charles Peirce,
The attention that James gave to the 'will' and its
position in the justification of indeterminism is directly
connected to DuBois ’ developing ideas of truth in the fol-
lowing manner. In sympathy with James' efforts to suggest
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an alternative to the associationists
'
position of deter-
minism, i.e. a mechanistic explanation of and reduction of
consciousness to brain activity, DuBois stressed that the
will should not be correlated to "nervous discharge accom-
panying the feeling of effort to do something." To suggest
this connection would be to suggest that the will had a
physiological origin. The will for James must have an
internal origin. This insured its uniqueness and demanded
selectivity among the alternatives presented in light of
human needs and interests. This selection was accomplished
by the mind. The mind was then made an active element in
decision making, not a central dispatcher for a conscious
automata. But the mind in James's plan offered even greater
service to the human than mere selection from among the
many stimuli presented to it. The mind allowed man to be
a conscious knower
:
The knower is an actor, and co-efficient
of the truth on one side, whilst on the
other he registers the truth which he
helps to create. Mental interests,
hypotheses, postulates, so far as they
are bases for human action - action
which to a great extent transforms the
world - help to make the truth which
they declare. In other words there
belongs to mind, from its birth
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upward, a spontaneity, a vote. It is in
the game, and not a mere looker-on.^
The suggestion here is that there does not exist a world of
truth independent of our own knowledge. If there were, then
the mind would be passive in the presence of that body of
knowledge. Contrary to this passivity James argued that
because the mind, the will, was free it helped to create
part of the world it came to know. The hint of the prag-
matic view now comes through. The idea that the mind is a
partner in the generation of truth leads us to James ' argu-
ment, as presented by Morton White in The Age of Analysis:
The true is that which we ought to believe;
That which we ought to believe is what is
best for us to believe; Therefore, the true
is that which is best for us to believe.
^
There have been many objections voiced to this argument as
developed by James. Of note for this part of our discussion
are the objections to the second premise, which demand for
example, that James make clear response to the question,
,; Good for whom?" DuBois objected to the question "Good for
whom?" being answered by the response, "For the individual!"
In "The Renaissance of Ethics" written in 1889, we find
DuBois making a clear distinction between choices made by the
individual based upon his desires to be true of an opinion
and choices made by an individual based upon his desire to
seek the Truth. The Truth for DuBois was that which was
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unchanging, and the advancement of man was the measure of
the progress he made toward becoming more knowledgeable of
Truth
.
What then is the step needed to complete
the renaissance of ethics and differentiate
modern from scholastic ethics? It is, I take
it, that thought be separated as follows:
SCIENCE to answer WHAT? —
>
TRUTH
TELEOLOGY to answer WHY? —» ETHICS
Man seeks answers to these two questions:
What is this? Why is it such as it is?
There are two methods he may pursue: he
may guess at why it is, or he may system-
atically and carefully find out what it is
in order that facts may guide his guesses
and ultimately lead him to the Truth.
Manifestly if his work is any ways intricate,
and if it is of any moment whether he arrives
at the Truth or not, he should take the latter
method: true it may never lead him to the
Truth, but it will lead him nearer than any
7
other path.
The discussion which DuBois directs to this subject,
of the methodology of the search for Truth, comprises fully
the last quarter of the discussion in the "Renaissance of
Ethics". All processes are sharply criticized which employ
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answers to the "WHY?" without first becoming involved or
benefitting from a systematic search for Truth which is
the mark of science in its answering the "WHAT?".
The World has partially come to the con-
clusion, that it must fully come to the
conclusion that the only way to find why
the world is, is to find what it is - the
only path to teleology is science.
^
I suggest that DuBois' assertion, "The only path to
teleology is science," and later, "The object then of
science is Truth; Truth is the one path to teleology, tele-
ology is ethics," are points of criticism directed against
the philosophical position of his intellectual mentor. For
James truth is additive and modifiable, i.e. we add to the
beliefs held by our ancestors. Suppose one is confronted
with data that cannot be reconciled with opinions one now
holds. According to James one is to find a new truth
through the pragmatic exercise of determining which is
important in one's own life. James expresses his view
aphoristically in these words:
'The true' is only the expedient in our
way of thinking, just as 'the right' is
the only expedient in the way of our
9behavior
.
DuBois claims, to the contrary, that the individual has
responsibility to seek 'the true', which is important in
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one’s own life, only as it will benefit men, not just what
an individual determines to be important to himself. in
"The Renaissance of Ethics" DuBois states that it is
the duty of each individual to choose
between the two possible worlds: a)
the best possible, b) the worst pos-
sible, when the difference between the
two is not based upon the like or dis-
like but rather upon the individual to
select the universe which is Right or
the universe which is Wrong. The Right
and the Wrong are separated by the pro-
cess of answering "What is each?"^
These demands are satisfied for DuBois by making science,
i.e. a systematic search, a requirement for seeking ’the
true’. Thus there in fact may be a "jolt" to the thinking
and understanding of the individual which James sought to
avoid. The argument presented by DuBois is consistent
with his experiences of the past and the designs which,
even then, he was in the process of constructing for his
future work.
DuBois' rejection of James's pragmatic view is high-
lighted in the text of the Commencement Address given by
DuBois in 1890 when he received his Bachelor's Degree from
Harvard. The address was titled, "Jefferson Davis as a
Representative of Civilization", In it DuBois described
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Jefferson Davis in this way:
However Jefferson Davis may appear as
a man, as race, or a nation, his life
can only logically mean this: the
advance of a part of the world at the
expense of the whole; the overwhelming
sense of the I, and the consequent for-
getting of the Thou. 11
Davis did not attempt to make the best possible world.
According to DuBois, Davis did not do so because he made
decisions based upon dogma, rather than upon evidence
empirically gather through a science. In James's words,
the true for Davis had become the expedient way of thinking
and the right had become the expedient in the way of be-
havior, however, the result had little good, if any, for
all concerned.
In The Commencement Address of 1890, as in his "Ren-
aissance" thesis of 1889, we see that Duty for DuBois is
to be guarded by actions which answer to the Truth as
honestly determined through systematic investigation which
considers as many alternatives as is possible. Thus the
involvement of Jefferson Davis "in the crowning absurdity,
became the peculiar champion of a people fighting to be
free in order that another people should not be free,"
Given James's view that the true is the expedient in our
way of thinking, then Jefferson Davis can be viewed as a
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pragmatist and it is such pragmatism which DuBois attacks.
So far I have mentioned that according to James' prag-
matic theory, truth is what is "Immediately satisfying to
some individual", i.e. that which gives one the maximum
possible sum of satisfactions, but consistency with pre-
vious truth and with novel fact". What is true for an
individual is certainly important, but James argues that
more important are
our fundamental ways of thinking about things
which are discoveries of exceedingly remote
ancestors, which have been able to preserve
themselves throughout the experience of all
subsequent time ... We plunge forward into
the field of fresh experience with beliefs
of our ancestors; these determine what we
notice; what we notice determines what we
do; what we do again determines what we
experience; so from one thing to another,
altho the stubborn fact remains that there is
sensible flux, what is true of it seems from
the first to the last to be largely a
matter of our own creation .
^
The text from which the above is cited was first pub-
lished in 1907, twenty years after James' first meeting
with DuBois. About ten years earlier, 1898, James pre-
sented an address entitled "Philosophical Conceptions and
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Pra£ica l Results" which gave first voice to what he called
the principle of practicalism or pragmatism. This address
presented ideas with which James had been in contact since
Peirce had presented related thoughts in 1878 (actually
Peirce had earlier presented the principle of pragmatism
before the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge in 1872). The
period of the DuBois/James encounter was thus a formative
period in the development James’s pragmatic thought and
of positions he later explained in lectures and books. The
passage from James quoted above concerns the debt we pay
to our ancestors in what we hold to be true. I suggest
that we can uncover another area of concern for DuBois,
which sparks the repetition of DuBois' call made within
"The Renaissance of Ethics" i.e. a systematic approach in
the search for Truth. A systematic approach would avoid
the problems generated by the first person pronouns used
by James, e.g. "our fundamental ways of thinking", "our
remote ancestors", "we determine", "our nouns and adjec-
tives", etc., which did not include DuBois, the descendent
of Africans. The history of Africa, viz. the cultures and
socities which flourished, the art, the social structures
/\
and systems, trade, language, philosophy, etc., was denied,
by the historical researchers, to have ever had any signi-
ficance or importance. In the late 19th century this at-
titude was used as one point of justification for the
expansion into and colonization of Africa.
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Before coining to Harvard DuBois had spent three years
(1885-1888) earning a Bachelor's Degree from Fisk University.
Fisk was then a school with an all-Black student body, in
Nashville, Tenn. . During the summers there DuBois worked
in the hamlets of the countryside tutoring and giving
instruction to the Black children now newly born into free-
dom. The adults within these hamlets had some twenty years
before also been newly born into freedom. The lessons
which DuBois taught were not to match the lessons he learned.
He learned to appreciate the intellectual hunger present in
his young charges, a hunger which he could not satisfy
during a summer's meeting and a hunger which had not magic-
ally appeared after the emancipation. But more important
was the resolve DuBois developed to investigate scienfi-
cally the facts which lead to the bondage that, by law and
social convention, kept a freed people in a new slavery,
i.e. the color caste system. The pain of this continued
oppression was exacerbated because DuBois realized that the
history of this oppressed people had content which was
denied importance. If the 'truth', of James's under-
standing, was based upon the discoveries of exceedingly
remote ancestors, then DuBois' ancestors of Africa must too
be included; however, he found no such record nor reference.
If the truth is realized in stages and the beliefs of our
ancestors determine what we notice, what we do, what we
experience, then that truth is untruthful when it denies
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part of that by which it is determined. In demanding a
systematic search for truth based upon a science unbiased
by dogma or scholastic teleological faith, DuBois can be
seen calling into question the credibility of the Jamesian
pragmatic theory’s understanding of truth, and its suggested
answer to the question 'what is the true?"
CHAPTER III
DUBOIS: HIS OWN PHILOSOPHY
(Though I suggest in Chapter II that DuBois was not as
closely associated with Jamesian pragmatism as generally
thought, I present in this Chapter some worries which sug-
gest that DuBois would not have been at ease embracing
Peircean pragmatism. A subtle point which lies in the
background, but has some importance on the Chapter's point
of view, is the suggestion that within Peirce's work is
exampled mid-nineteenth century thought which had not yet
come to grips with the complexities engendered by racism:
the problem of the twentieth century.)
The DuBois and Peirce Separation
Bruce Kuklick, in his discussion, "Charles Sanders
Peirce"
,
in The Rise of American Philosophy
,
suggests that
Peirce's revised theory of knowledge was based on the
"primacy of subject-predicate logic." Though it is unlikely
that DuBois and Peirce discussed Peirce's pragmatic philos-
ophy, DuBois seems to have either encountered or anticipated
Peirce's theory. Within "Of the Dawn of Freedom", the
second essay in The Souls of Black Folk
,
DuBois presents a
study of the 'period of history from 1861 to 1872 so far as
it relates to the American Negro." In this essay DuBois
stressed the efforts of the Negro people to defeat the South,
as well as Negro people who gave themselves to the defense of
that social institution, slavery, which was predicated upon
their being members of an inferior race. In this essay
DuBois details the programs leading to and comprising the
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Freedman's Bureau. The hopes and successes of Blacks were
noted, in addition to a developed intellectual climate which
undermined hopes, plans, achievements of Black people. A
reflection of that theoretical framework, upon which hung
the principles of the nation, which undercut the Blacks’
aspirations to realize full and equal participation within
American society, can be found in Peirce's theory of knowl-
edge. Peirce was developing his theory of the "logic of
relations" during the 1860 's; this is the period during which
DuBois discussed in his essay "Of the Dawn of Freedom".
Kuklick represents Peirce's theory of knowledge as follows:
( 1 ) "If relations were as abstract and as funda-
mental as the qualities of subject-predicate
logic, the meaning of our concept of an ob-
ject might be in its relations to other ob-
jects or in the relations among its states
„1
at various times.
This may be read to imply, when considering the Negro
problem:
( 1 ') The Negro is related to all things as I , a
white man, am related, or the Negro is a man
v/ho has at various times relations different,
than mine, among his states.
Which disjunct of ( 1 ) would be considered persuasive by a
nineteenth century white intellectual. Peirce argued for
the second disjunct; he continues
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(2) . the relations in which a thing stood
to other things might determine its "essen-
tial nature" (quality) rather than this
nature determining its relations to other
things . "
^
This may be read to imply, when considering the Negro
problem;
(2') The manner in which a Negro is, in regards
j
to all those things about him, e.g. culture,
education, skills, intelligence, etc., may
readily reflect his "essential nature" rather
than the Negro being considered a man deter-
mining his position as I.
And, if one were to have asked in 1863 of a white Bostonian
intellectual, such as Peirce, "How do you explain the apparent
differences between the white and black races?", he might
have answered
(3) . . the meaning of our conception of an
object might depend on the law governing its
relations to other objects and not on the
3quality it embodied."
This may be read to imply, when considering the Negro
problem;
(3‘
)
The Negro is a man who stands in a different
relation to other things when compared to a
white, and it is not a shared quality of
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"manhood" that he embodies.
Peirce may have never had occasion to discuss the
Negro problem, though such a discussion of the Civil War
would have been difficult for a twenty-two year-old male
to avoid. However, we do find hint of such a concern within
the following:
though the question of realism and nominalism
has its roots in the technicalities of logic,
its branches reach about our life. The
question whether the genus homo has any ex-
istence except as individuals, is the
question whether there is anything of any
more dignity, worth, and importance than
individual happiness, individual aspiration,
and individual life. Whether men really
have anything in common, so that the com-
munity is to be considered as an end in
itself, and if so, what the relative value of
the two factors is, is the most fundamental
practical question in regard to every public
institution the constitution of which we have
4
it in our power to influence.
It seems evident to me that the first two lines of the
above announce Peirce's recognition that the language which
is used in logic, by which properties are ascribed of ob-
jects, and, which is expressed by a formal theory of sets.
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also "reaches about our life". what does he mean by "reaches
about our life"? Given Peirce's theory of meaning he had to
include, in any perception of an object of experience which
had meaning, knowing the habits it involves. What is the
habit involved with the branches of the technicalities of
logic reaching about our life? The habit is asserting
statements which are true. It seems that Peirce's pragmatism
asserted that the same way questions of philosophy are ad-
dressed and answered so too could the questions which are
asked by societies of men be addressed and answered: "The
question whether the genus homo has any existence except
as individuals is the most fundamental practical question
in regard to every public institution the constitution of
5
which we have it in our power to influence ." What is the
power spoken of here? Who are the 'we' for whom he speaks?
What is the constitution which will be influenced and how
will that influence be exerted? Quickly said the "power"
and the "influence" seem to be correction of faulty use
of words which state many things which are not true; the
constitution is an abstract thing which collectively make')
up the laws which rule the organization's functionings.
However, if Peirce's theory of meaning, not extended beyond
the questions which address it as a philosophy, is met by
worries to which satisfactory reply cannot be given, then
the power and influence that philosophy might have upon the
constitutions of every public institution is questioned.
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The Collapse and Rise of a Pragmatic Theory
Peirce’s theory collapsed at two points. Peirce in one
case asserted that to know a thing’s meaning was simply to
determine what habits (modes of action) it engendered. "What
^ thing means is simply habits it involves,"^ Objects were
then no more than all their conceivable "effects ". 7 While
holding this position Peirce also argued that there was an
independently existing object which caused the phenomena of
"effects". To accommodate this notion of phenomena Kuklick
reports Peirce asserted "the real was both a permanent and
inexhaustable possibility of sensation and wholly cognized.
He rendered this notion consistent by postulating an infi-
8nite future that realized those possibilities of sensation."
One problem which such a notion could not convincingly re-
spond to was that if inquiry were to be carried on infi-
nitely then inquiry would be incognizable. This notion also
seemed to contradict Peirce's earlier work which claimed,
in agreement with Kant, that metaphysical realism was an
"instantly fatal" idea, i.e. the idea of a thing in itself
9
conceived as a thing existing independent of mind:
The essence of (Kant and Peirce's) philos-
ophy was to regard the real object as deter-
mined by the mind. ... In short reality
was regarded as a normal product of mental
. .
10
action, and not as the incognizable cause of it.
57
Unlike Peirce's pragmatic theory of meaning, James’s
pragmatic theory of truth became untenable when, within
James s scheme, truth became dependent upon the experiences
had by individuals. This could not guarantee universality.
Peirce’s pragmatic theory of meaning collasped with Peirce's
attempt to construct meanings upon beliefs held of an object.
An object of thought, because of the infinitude of inquiry
being incognizable, was claimed to be incognizable. Further-
more, Peirce’s "belief" demanded ’modes of action', 'habit',
'effects' of and upon thought. The theory of meaning was
lost when the objects which have meaning, i.e. objects of
thought, became objects independent of thought - metaphysical
realism is instantly fatal. DuBois offered another prag-
matic theory of meaning. His statement of that pragmatic
theory of meaning is continuously used as the cornerstone
of his pragmatic theory of truth. It was ’truth' for which
DuBois strove. He claimed that a correct theory of meaning
postulated that we, as thinking beings, moved toward the
absolute. Truth, only by pursuits of intellect. The follow-
ing is from DuBois' 1908 lecture presented at Fisk Univer-
sity on the occasion of DuBois' twentieth reunion visit.
The lecture is titled "Galileo Galilei".
. . .
Judge this World Genuis not simply
by the things he learned, but rather by
the ignorance of his Age. This was a
day when falling and gravitation were
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things too slight for human minds to
ponder over; when time depended on sun-
dials and hourglasses; and when the
grand old legend of Joshua and the sun
in Analon was regarded as a plain and
literal statement of fact. It was a
day when men assumed knowledge of the
whole Truth and argued down to individ-
ual fact, instead of ceaselessly, end-
lessly, and minutely studying the fact
and then guessing as we do today cautiously
at the mighty shadow of Reality .
^
DuBois' theory entailed studying fact and then trying
scientifically to extrapolate Truth. How does one, accord-
ing to DuBois approach Truth? Initially, the meanings of
words which have been accepted and are in common use within
a language must be examined to seek discrepancies and correct
such if found.
. , .
There was never a time in the history
of America when the system (slave trade and
the institution of slavery) had a slighter
economic, political, and moral justification
than in 1787; and yet, with this real, ex-
istent, growing evil before their eyes, a
bargain largely of dollars and cents was
allowed to open the highway that led
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straight to the Civil War.
. .
With the faith of the nation broken
at the very outset, the system of slavery
untouched, and twenty years' respite given
to the slave trade to feed and foster it,
there began, with 1787, that system of
bargaining, truckling, and compromising
with a moral, political, and economic
monstrosity which makes the history of
our dealing with slavery in the first
half of the nineteenth century so dis-
creditable to a great people. . . , One
cannot, to be sure, demand of whole
nations exceptional moral foresight and
heroism, but a certain hard common sense
in facing the complicated phenomena of
political life must be expected in every
progressive people. In some respects we
as a nation seem to lack this; we have
the somewhat inchoate idea that we are
not destined to be harassed with the
great social questions, and that even if
we are, and fail to answer them, the fault
is with the question and not with us. Con-
sequently we often congratulate ourselves
more on getting rid of a problem than on
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solving it. Such an attitude is
dangerous; we have and shall have, as
other peoples have had, critical, momentus,
A
and pressing questions to answer.
. . .
It behooves the United States, there-
fore, in the interest both of scientific
truth and of future social reform, care-
fully to study such chapters of her history
as that of the suppression of the slave
trade. The most obvious question which
this study suggests is: How far in a state
can a recognized moral wrong safely be
compromised? 12
DuBois designed to solve a problem, the problem of the
color-line, i.e. racism. Before that problem could be ad-
dressed the meanings of the words and concepts had to be
first established; for there was no understanding between
the races. That this problem was long standing was reported
DuBois
:
The colonists averred with perfect truth
that they did not commerce this fatal
traffic, but that it was imposed upon them
from without. Nevertheless, all too soon
did they lay aside scruples against it and
hasten to share its material benefits. Even
those who braved the rough Atlantic for the
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highest moral motives fell early victims
to the allurements of this system. Thus,
throughout colonial history, in spite of
many honest attempts to stop the further
pursuit of the slave trade, we notice back
of nearly all such attempts a certain
moral apathy, an indisposition to attack
the evil with the sharp weapons which its
nature demanded. Consequently, there
developed steadily, irresistibly, a vast
social problem which required two centuries
and a half for a nation of trained European
13
stock and boasted moral fibre to solve.
How and where were efforts being made to encourage and es-
tablish moral standards of a nation in the middle of the
19th century? Most notably at centers such as Cambridge,
Massachusetts. In January 1860, a committee of the
Harvard Board of Overseers stated, in a committee report
"Intellectual and Moral Philosophy", that training in
philosophy was "brief and hurried," "an exercise of memory
more than understanding." ’’The effect of this curtailing
and abandonment of the most important studies in the course
14
of a liberal education was evident and . . . well known."
Without proper drill in moral philosophy. Harvard graduates,
it was feared, might succumb to attacks on "the fundamental
principles of religion and ethics, and without proper drill
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in intellectual philosophy they would never attain the
mental development and self-discipline necessary for
successful work in the world. ^ Early members of the
^arvard Department of Philosophy were
Francis Bowen born 1811;
Chauncey Wright born 1830;
John Fiske born 1842;
Francis Ellingwood Abbot born 1836;
Charles Sanders Peirce born 1839;
William James born 1842;*
George Herbert Palmer born 1842;* and
*
Josiah Royce born 1855.
All of these listed above had lived through the Civil War
period. (George Santayana is not included for he was born
and raised in Spain.) The point is that DuBois brought a
unique genius to Cambridge in 1888. It was a genius which
grasped the "pragmatism” than newly born and evolving.
DuBois' appraoch to pragmatism was based upon searches for
meaning and truth. Owing to his unique intellectual, social,
and cultural background, even when compared to the other
Black students, who had preceded him as undergraduates at
Harvard, a distinct pragmatic theory of meaning was offered.
*Instructor of DuBois.
CHAPTER IV
DUBOIS AS AN EPISTEMOLOGIST
(The study of human history begins with an investigation
of men and events whose names have been recorded and preservedfor posterity. The study of the effect of those events and
the meaning of the terms and concepts, used to describe them
and the thoughts of the men and women involved, is a study
of what we know, i.e. a study of knowledge. In the academic
pursuits, found within the discipline of philosophy, the
study of knowledge is called "epistemology”
. William
Edward Burghardt DuBois investigated a body of human know-
ledge by means of the meaning of terms and concepts which
he believed to be generally held and accepted by those who
used and applied such terms and concepts. He took his
training, in the discipline of philosophy, and applied it
to the investigation of the problems of race relations,
W.E.B. DuBois, I claim, was an epistemologist
. His name,
however, is not found in the "Index", nor is his name
mentioned in any discussion within the Encyclopedia of
Philosophy . I believe this is a serious omission. This
Chapter is written to claim: 1) DuBois was indeed a
'philosopher' in the academic sense of the term;, and 2)
that DuBois, more specifically, was an epistemologist who
offered important insights into the studies of knowledge
and truth, which even today are overlooked.)
DuBois' Background
During the years 1894-1909 DuBois was determined to
accomplish one goal. He was determined to become a
'classic figure', e.g. Aristotle, Socrates, Homer, Virgil,
etc.. DuBois' early interest lay with the men who had
defined concepts of the ages past. The influence of these
ancient thinkers was important, but, unlike them, DuBois
further determined that he would have to be the reporter,
the sculptor, the biographer, the translator, the doctor;
63
64
all of these for himself and by himself. The aid of the
societies' institutions, which had offered their nominal
benefits to the classic figures of the ages, was not avail-
able to DuBois. The task of a man designing to become a
'classic' figure is rarely considered today. The areas of
expertise have broadened too greatly. The task of a Negro
being remembered or planning to be remembered as a classic
figure during the last quarter of the nineteenth century
was unthought of, except by DuBois. DuBois accepted the
challenge to formally study that human trait of assigning
meanings to terms and concepts. It was within that process
of assigning meanings that DuBois claimed racism was to be
uncovered. With a study of the processes of naming and
defining, DuBois planned to show the injustices racism
perpetuated within interracial associations. DuBois assured
himself that if he could add to the body of human knowledge
he would be remembered as a classic figure. DuBois' con-
tribution to the body of human knowledge was presenting a
corrected and more accurate definition of racism.
Racism Defined
Racism had come to be understood in the last score
years of the nineteenth century as the suppression of one
race by another race with the subsequent racial relation-
ship to primarily benefit the suppressor. Racism would not
be a moral wrong if there was a suggestion, no matter how
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slight, that the race oppressed and suppressed was dif-
ferent from the oppressor m more meaningful ways other than
external and physical features. This claim, for example,
is attacked in the following which appeared under "Editoral",
CRISIS
,
vol
. 1, No. 2, December 1910:
The Inevitable
In the argument of the prejudice there
is a certain usual ending: "But this
is inevitable." For instance, a crime
is committed by you. I am lynched. "It
is inevitable," cries the bystander,
"they were both Negroes." A brown man
is admitted to a theatre, misbehaves
and is ejected. I apply for a ticket
and am refused. "It is inevitable,"
sighs the manager, "you are brown."
A yellow man is a fool; therefore,
Smith, who is also yellow, is treated
like an idiot. "I am sorry," remarks
the policeman, but they are both yellow."
What is the real argument in these
cases? It is this: "People who resemble
each other in one important respect ought
to resemble each other in all important
respects and therefore be treated alike.
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If by any chance they do not so resemble
each other, this is unfortunate, for the
same treatment must be meted out. This is
inevitable .
"
Is it? It is not inevitable. It
is a criminal injustice. It is inhuman
treatment and it is socially dangerous.
It is based on the unscientific assumption
that human beings who resemble each other
in one important particular, like color
of skin, resemble each other in all par-
ticulars. This is patently false. More-
over, the social condemnation of an un-
desirable act or character loses all
force or reason when it is directed
against one who has not committed the
act or has not the condemned character.
To allow the mistreatment of wuch an
innocent man—to condone it or defend
it, is not inevitable; it is a crime.'*'
DuBois later argues that racism is the predication of the
exercise of power, by a group over another group, when the
dominant group believes that there is a significant dif-
ference between the two. Racism, additional, demanded
that the dominant group argue, without definitive evidence.
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that there existed a possibility that meaningful differences
could be found between the races represented by each group.
DuBois faced a body of statements which argued that there
indeed existed a significant difference, i.e. that there
were races of men which exampled a more highly developed
human than were other races. DuBois presented a definitive
response, supported by research, denying that there was
a difference of significance.
For example, suppose that an issue of concern within
a national community, made up of peoples from several
different races, creates a question of such importance that
the question's not being answered threatens the lives and
well-being of at least one of the involved races of that
nation. Suppose further that a decision needs to be made
to carry on those activities which will lead to the settling
of the question. Suppose it is also the case that the
answer to the question is continually alleged not to be
known by the authorities of the controlling, non-threatened
group. DuBois suggested that, in such a case, actions,
predicated on the possibility that the answer would be "true",
are wrong just as much at the time committed, when only the
possibility of their wrongness was present, as when the
answer 'false' is realized of the question. Until DuBois the
question, "Is there a difference of significance between the
Caucasian and Negroid races?" was unsettled. The Western
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European peoples and their societies were predicated upon
the assumption that there was the possibility that races
were different. DuBois argued that that claim was not
available to racism's defenders. To support his claim
DuBois embarked upon scienfitic investigation of race
relations and evolution. DuBois planned an investigation
of the histories of selected races. Each race was to be
scientific examined, as understood within the terms of
scientific investigation of the late nineteenth century.
If the races were meaningfully similar there would be
evidence gathered from this search. Thus there would be
material to counter the claims of 'possible' inferiority
of a race. For the African people DuBois had to reconstruct
much of their history. The beginning of the project to
reconstruct the history of Africa was undertaken as an act
of love. The benefits of such an investigation would add
to the broadening body of knowledge about peoples.
Thus, DuBois purposefully undertook studies of recorded
history. He examined the meaning of words of past and
present cultures. An example of DuBois' examination of a
word is the following:
SOCIAL EQUALITY
/
At last we have a definition of the very
elusive phrase "Social Equality" as
applied to the Negro problem. In stating
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their grievances colored people have
recently specified these points:
1. Disfranchisement, even on
educated Negroes.
2
. Curtailment of common school
training
.
3. Confinement to Ghettoes.
4. Discrimination in wages,
5. Confinement to menial employment.
6. Systematic insult of their women.
7. Lynching and miscarriage of justice.
8. Refusal to recognize fitness "in
political or industrial life."
9. Personal discourtesy.
Southern papers in Charlotte, Richmond, New
Orleans and Nashville have with singular
unanimity hastened to call this complaint
an unequivocal demand for "social equality",
and as such absolutely inadmissible. We
are glad to have always suspected this
smooth phrase. We recommend on this showing
that hereafter colored men who have hastened
to disavow any desire for "social equality"
should carefully read the above list of
disabilities which social inequality would
seem to prescribe.
^
(CRISIS, Vol , 1, No. 3, January 1911)
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DuBois and Race
DuBois had carried on studies, between the years 1885-
1894, on the campuses of Fisk, Harvard, and the University
of Berlin in which subjects and topics of classical history
had been insightfully presented. To that, which was depicted
as a continuum of history, i.e, the history of Western
Culture, DuBois pieced together a parallel line of history
of African peoples. The shards of DuBois' archaeological
dig were items which had been recorded within Western his-
tory which, though, small and seemingly unconnected, sug-
gested hints of uncovered past thought. DuBois developed
tools to look beyond and behind the physical evidence and
reported on those statements which reflected African
thought. These statements, which reported the African view
of the world, answered to two truth conditions, i.e. the
statements were either true or false. DuBois suggested,
however, that with every statement which was asserted
about peoples of African lineage, came three, rather than
two truth claims. The three claims were that the statement
was either true, false, or possible (with the claim of the
possible siding with the answer desired by the questioner)
.
Without access to the claim that it is possible that the
African is less human than other races, the force of the
arguments of racism was lost.
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What is at stake here is my claim that DuBois determined
that it was an important task to demonstrate that complexity
of thought, which seemed to be the argument of those who
desired to mark a difference between races, was not vouch-
safed to a race. By showing that complexity of thought was
general among people and not peculiar to a race, DuBois
could then claim that racism was the predication of action
designed to bring about the destruction and genocide of the
history of a people. For example DuBois asked, of an African
song sung to him during his early childhood, "What is
its meaning?" Though not trained in music, he recognized
that the songs of the African, as exampled by the one sung
to him, accurately recorded one understanding, one con-
sciousness, of the relationship which man had had with that
which was beyond himself, i.e. metaphysical expressions.
Could it be that periods of human history, which are marked
by a particular consideration of a philosophic issue (e.g,
examine, in detail, structures and implications of certain
statements; complexity of thought) were not determined by
a race of a people at a given time. However, if this his-
tory, which is recorded human thought, is obscurred, then
argument asserting a possibility of meaningful difference
existing between races is given support, i.e. there is
no evidence to the contrary. The 'possibility' of such
difference had to be dispelled. The question whether or
not there did exist a meaningful difference between races.
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especially as it concerned African peoples, could no longer
remained unsettled. In particular, American citizens had
to be shown that the slave trade from 1638-1870, and all
American institutions which sprung from the slave institution.
was founded and supported by this claim. America, merely
as a representative of Western Culture continued to believe
of the possibility that Western science and thought was to
prove itself superior over other races. This belief lead
-'N
to the following paradox:
(T) 1 . W.E.B. DuBois is a Negro.
(F) 2. W.E.B. DuBois is a Caucasian.
(T) 3. W.E.B. DuBois is not a Negro.
(T) 4. W.E.B. DuBois is not a Caucasian.
If the truth values noted in the left hand margin are to
hold, it is probable that 1-4 must have come from some
proposition such as the following:
(T & F) 5. W.E.B. DuBois is a Negro and
W.E.B. DuBois is a Caucasian.
Since DuBois was descended from African, Dutch, and French
ancestors then we can only achieve the falsity of (2) by
the proposition (5) offering itself as a contradiction.
So what is the relationship which holds between the two
races which so firmly suggests that there is a definitive
answer to the question, "What proportion of Negro to
Caucasian ancestry does it take to denote that individual
is a Negro?" As of 1967, intermarriage between Negro and
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Caucasian was forbidden in seventeen (17) states including
Delaware
,
Missouri and Oklahoma. This act of marriage was
punishable with fines up to $1,000 and imprisonment up to
five (5) years. It had been after World War II, that four-
teen states west of the Mississippi had repealed such laws.
Undoubtedly, as these seventeen states in 1967 demonstrated,
the proportion was not important, the merest trace of Negro
blood was enough for the marking. To attack this thought
DuBois employed his pragmatic methods which were announced
before the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
on November 19, 1897. "The speech outlined the theoretical
framework and practical means for studying the black race in
America." DuBois' pragmatic principle, which was to be
applied to that study, is stated in 'Section 5: A Program of
Future Study' of the speech entitled "The Study of The Negro
Problems"
:
The plan of study is without a doubt, long, difficult
and costly, and yet is not more than commensurable
with the size and importance of the subject with
which it is to deal. It will take years and decades
to carry out such a plan, with the barest measure of
success, and yet there can be no doubt but this plan
or something similar to it, points to the quickest
path toward the ultimate solution of the present dif-
4
culties
.
The ultimate solution was to establish that the possibility
that there was a significant difference between races was
either true or false. DuBois was descendent from African,
French Hugenot, and Dutch forefathers. And yet he, and
those who had far less African blood, was considered Negro.
The study of the Negro problems was then designed to
accomplish two objectives: 1) that though a social prob-
lem "is the failure of an organized social group to realize
its group ideals, through the inability to adapt a certain
desired line of action to given conditions of life, there
is not one Negro problem.
. . rather (the Negro problem) is
a plexus of social problems some new, some old, some simple,
some complex. These problems have their one bond of unity
in the act that they group themselves about these Africans
whom two centuries of slave-trading brought into the land;"'’
2) that the presence of African heritage in the lineage of
any individual does not limit not separate that individual’s
humanness but points to an irrationality as concerns the
notion of human by which some argue for the existence of
such a separation. To accomplish these objectives DuBois
undertook the task of completing a scientific study of the
Negro. He offered his results to show that the contradic-
tion implied by the statement. The sentence 'W.E.B. DuBois
is a Negro and Caucasian’ is true, is a result of laws and
social thought having been made "to fit a class distinguished
by its condition more than by its race or color." The
body of researched material compiled by DuBois during his
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work on The Suppression of the Slave Trade to The United
§-tates ^e^ca , 1638 - 1870 ; The Philadelphia Negro ; six-
teen (16) monographs published as The Atlanta Studies
,
(the
first attempts to scientifically study the problems of
Black people); and. The CRISIS ; all this lead DuBois to
answer that there was no difference between races in any
meaningful way. Consequently, if there was no difference
between races, then racism, based upon the possibility that
there was a difference was a wrong. If there were no sig-
nificant differences between races, then it was a moral
wrong for one race to arbitrarily suppress another group
when the suppression was justified by false criteria. The
actions, needed to bring about the elimination of racism,
were initiated and defined in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries by DuBois. He based his definition upon
his epistemological interests and expressed his definitions
in keeping with his developed pragmatic principles.
An example of DuBois* adaptation of his pragmatic
principles, as applied to combating racism, is found in
his early editorials of The CRISIS magazine. The CRISIS
functioned as the official news organ of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (1910)
.
There were many influencial individuals involved in this
Association's creation. However, what is indisputable is
that DuBois was the individual who had the greatest experi-
ence and the longest record of actively forming organizations
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and developing programs to fight the encroachments of racism
within American society. The encroachment of racism ab-
normally restricted certain individuals' expressions of
personal choice, desire, will, volution, etc.. This en-
croachment, of course, became a restrictive element forced
upon a race of people. The first "Editorial" of The CRISIS
,
Vol. One, No. One, November 1910, contained the following
two articles:
THE CRISIS
The object of this publication is to set forth
those facts and arguments which show the danger
of race predjudice, particularly as manifested
today toward colored people. It takes its
name from the fact that the editors believe
that this is a critical time in the history
of the advancement of men. Catholicity and
tolerance, reason and forebearance can today
make the world-old dream of human brotherhood
approach realization; while bigotry and pre-
judice, emphasized race consciousness and force
can repeat the awful history of the contacts
of nations and groups in the past. We strive
for this higher and broader vision of Peace and
Good Will.
The policy of The CRISIS will be simple
and well-defined.
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It will first and foremost be a news-
paper: it will record important happenings
and movements in the world which bear on
the great problem of interracial relations,
and especially those which effect the Negro-
American
.
Secondly, it will be a review of opinion
and literature, recording briefly books,
articles, and important expressions of opinion
in the white and colored press on the race
problem.
Thirdly, it will publish a few short
articles
.
Finally, its editorial pages will stand
for the rights of men, irrespective of color
or race. For the highest ideals of American
democracy, and for reasonable but earnest and
persistent attempt to gain these rights and
realize these ideals. The magazine will be
the organ of no clique or party and will
avoid personal rancor of all sorts. In the
absence of proof to the contrary it will
assume honesty or purpose on the part of all
7
men. North and South, white and black.
AGITATION
Some good friends of the cause we represent
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fear agitation. They say: "Do not agitate—do
not make a noise; work." They add, "Agitation
is destructive or at best negative—what is
wanted is positive constructive work."
Such honest critics mistake the function
of agitation. A toothache is agitation. Is
a toothache a good thing? No. Is it therefore
useless? No. It is supremely useful, for it
tells the body of decay, dyspepsia and death.
Without it the body would suffer unknowingly.
It would think: All is well, when lo! danger
lurks
.
The same is true of the Social Body.
Agitation is a necessary evil to tell of the
ills of the Suffering, Without it many a
nation has been lulled to false security and
preened itself with virtues it did not
possess
.
The function of this Association is to
tell this nation the crying evil of race
prejudice. It is a hard duty but a necessary
one. It is Pain; Pain is not good but Pain
is necessary. Pain does not aggravate disease
—
Disease causes Pain. Agitation does not mean
Aggravation—Aggravation calls for Agitation
g
in order that Remedy may be found.
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The argument presented in "Agitation" is of some interest;
i) A toothache is agitation,
ii) A toothache is not a good thing,
iii) Not a good thing is not useless,
iv) Therefore, a toothache is not useless.
DuBois continues the argument by stating that the usefulness
of a toothache is in its telling the "body of decay, dys-
pepsia and death" within it. Within the Social Body the
agitation can only be carried on by individuals. Agitation
is Pain. DuBois’ use of Pain as a metaphor for 'Agitation',
should be allowed various interpretations. To present these
various interpretations, before the reading public, demanded
that DuBois begin his own publications. DuBois gave some
form to his developed philosophical positions within the
limitations of the purposes of the particular journal,
magazine or newspaper. The CRISIS : A Record of the Darker
Races, during DuBois' term as editor (1910-1934), had more
impact upon twentieth century America than any other maga-
zine. The CRISIS reflected the spectrum of experiences had
by some who suffered here in the United States. When we
examine DuBois' work we confirm his claim that he applied
philosophy to the study of the problems of race relations,
DuBois was determined to make a career of philosophy. We
are told that at both undergraduate institutions he attended,
influential men in his academic experience tried to dissuade
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him from seeking a career in philosophy.
As an undergraduate, I had talked frankly
with William James about teaching philosophy,
my major subject. He discouraged me, not by
means because of my record in his classes.
He used to give me A's and even an A-plus,
but as he said candidly, there is "not much
chance for anyone earning a living as a philos-
opher." He was repeating just what Chase of
Fisk had said a few years previously.
I knew by this time (1892) that practically
my sole chance of earning a living combined
with study was to teach, and after my work with
Hart in United States history, I conceived the
idea of applying philosophy to an historical
interpretation of race relations.
In other words, I was trying to make my
first steps toward sociology as the science
of human action. It goes without saying that
no such field of study was then recognized at
Harvard or came to be recognized for 20 years
9
after
.
CHAPTER V
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS OF DUBOIS' PRAGMATISM
(The testing of a theory of truth involves presenting
arguments which offer differing points of concern. In this
Chapter
,
I argue that problems of the color-line faced today
may be addressed using DuBois' guidelines. I also argue
that DuBois' pragmatic approach may yet bring benefits.)
A Modern Argument of Possibility
In his January 8, 1980, nationally syndicated column,
James J. Kilpatrick discussed the "Perspective needed on
the King Holiday Bill". The topic concerned the efforts
of some Congressmen to have a national holiday designated
in January to honor Dr. Martin L. King, Jr.. Of interest
to this discussion are the two arguments advanced against
the bill which Kilpatrick found convincing:
It is wrong simply as a matter of public policy
apart from Dr. King, to accord permanent public
honors to any person until a sufficient time
has elapsed to put his achievements in per-
spective. Secondly the bill would make Dr.
King the only American in the whole of our
history to have a national holiday.'*'
The Morning Union 1/8/80 Springfield, MA
The first argument echoes the argument of possibility pre-
sented earlier, i.e. it is possible that Dr. King's
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achievements will be found less than "our" standard. Yet,
the possibility that Dr. King will measure up to a standard
Kilpatrick seems unwilling to consider. About Robin Beard's
amendment, which would designate the third Sunday in every
January for formal observance," Kilpatrick states, "The
Beard amendment is honor enough. I would let the matter go
at that." This too easily eliminates the consideration that
if after a "sufficient time has elapsed" and Dr. King's
achievements have lasted unchallenged, then the permanent
public honors would be rightly placed. Similarly, the
honors would have proved as rightly placed and given if
nationally conferred and recognized at this time.
Within the second argument, "the bill would make Dr.
King the only American in the whole of our history to have
a national holiday," there is a hint of the narrow Jamesian
use of the third person possessive pronoun "our". It may
be inferred from Kilpatrick's statement that the problem
is not that Dr. King would be the only American in the
whole of our history to have a national holiday in his
honor, rather the larger problem seems to be that, in the
honoring of Dr. King, attention would be focussed on those
areas of American history which American society is still
not yet ready to recognize. In Dr. King's last major
public address in Carnei^gte Hall, February 23, 1968, on the
centennial of DuBois birth, Dr. King spoke to this inference
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found in statements similar to Kilpatrick's notion of the
"whole of our history".
. . . it would be well to remind white America
°f its debt to Dr. DuBois. When they corrupted
Negro history they distorted American history
because Negroes are too big a part of the
building of this nation to be written out of
it without destroying scientific history.
White America, drenched with lies about
Negroes, has lived long in a fog of ignorance.
Dr. DuBois gave them a gift of truth for which
2they should eternally be indebted to him.
"Honoring Dr. DuBois" 2/23/68 Dr. Martin L.
King, Jr.
We are told by Kilpatrick that "Washington’s Birthday is
lawfully 'President's Day'. Kilpatrick's mentioning of this
would seem to shift the concentration from considering the
individual, Washington, to the consideration of the symbolic
use of Washington to bring the honor of the public to all
Presidents following and including him. This honor is a
gesture of respect that is paid to those who have been
elected into the nation's highest office. These are elected
standard bearers. In honoring one name, we honor not them
all individually, but the office they have shared succes-
sively, Similarly it is with Dr. King. In honoring him we
do not, as Kilpatrick claims, honor "an American", In
honoring Dr. King we honor all who have shared the office
of Negro Leader, all who have been the standard bearers.
Foremost among them we would honor Dr. DuBois.
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The question, which faced DuBois, and the other
standard bearers of the Negro cause, was, "What was the
supposed threat that the Negro presented to the white?"
At bottom the supposed threat which caused the greatest
alarm was miscegenation. (Miscegenation is understood to
be taken in its broadest terms.) Miscegenation was not
only the mixture of races through social and sexual inter-
course, but, also, miscegenation was the intermingling of
races via a violation of space which was valued by the
possessor of that space. "You're on my land!" "This is my
country!" "This is our community!" "I don't want them in
my neighborhood!" "And the next thing you know is that they
are living next door!" "I don't want them marrying my
daughter!" From this grouping of statements, the last has
particular interest. The unwanted group is given plural
reference. The supposedly desired object is metaphorically
and symbolically given singular reference, my daughter .
"My daughter" is all women, she is the embodiment of the
female image in which resided the purity of the race.
Slavery, war, murder, armed rebellion destruction of socie-
ties have sprung from this and related and/or concurrent
images which many groups of people have sought to protect
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and possess. In this manner, carried to further extremes,
this continent of North America, by right of conquest and
development, had fallen to whites. DuBois responded to
this basic argument of territorial possession by claiming
that white Americans could not claim this land, the moulding
of American Society, nor the building of any of these insti-
tutions. White America could not claim any of these with-
out recognizing and respecting similar, and as forceful,
claims of possession and protection made by the Black Amer-
ican. In DuBois 1900 lecture, "The Negro in the South and
in the North", we find the first printed usage of, "The
problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the
color-line." For the next three years this essay and
thirteen others were written and then gathered together
under the cover. The Souls of Black Folk . Because this
work argued against the idea of the white American having
a claim on all that America had developed, without respect-
ing the claims of the Black American, it is often suggested
that it was written primarily for the white reading public
of 1903.
. . .
it is a classic culmination of DuBois’
thought at that time . . . This volume is
written primarily for a white audience and
though some of what is said is outdated, it
still powerfully exemplifies the fierce belief
3
in man's willingness to reason with man.
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This suggestion is not entirely appropriate. The open-
ing paragraph in "The Forethought" reads:
HEREIN lie buried many things which if read
with patience may show the strange meaning
of being black here at the dawning of the
Twentieth Century. This meaning is not
without interest to you. Gentle Reader;
for the problem of the Twentieth Century
is the problem of the color line. I pray
you then, receive my little book in all
charity, studying my words with me, for-
giving mistake and foible for the sake of
the faith and passion that is in me, and
4
seeking the grain of truth hidden there.
The direct address form, I suggest, was intended for the
Black reading public. DuBois presented to the Black reading
public a form of argument which he believed would be a model
for other Blacks to use in arguing against racism. Racism's
effects upon the actions of the people were evidenced through
the justifications of actions practiced within the society.
Once the areas affected by racism were recognized a Black
could better protect himself and family from the onslaught
of racist actions. DuBois' work which outlined and detailed
the argument in full was The Souls of Black Folk . There
was much factual material within the reading of The Souls
of Black Folk. More factual material than could be taken
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in by a reader without long study. Nevertheless DuBois
presented to the casual reader melodies and refrains, both
figuratively and literally, of the experiences found within
the souls of Black folk, DuBois began each essay by trans-
cribing the staff, key, meter, notes and rest notations of
a "Sorrow Song".
They that walked in darkness sang songs in
the olden days - Sorrow Songs - for they
were weary at heart. And so before each
thought that I have written in this book
I have set a phrase, a haunting echo of
these weird songs in which the soul of
cr
the black slave spoke to men.
The argument supporting the claim, made by some
Americans, that it is a right of those who have possessions
to protect those possessions may be presented as follows:
If one claims possession of a thing, then one
has a right to protect that thing.
If a race claims possession of a social or cultural
institution, then it is the right of that race to
protect that institution.
If a possession is one which is to be protected,
then it is of value to the possessor.
If one claims the right to protect, then one
claims the right to possess.
The things which one possesses are claimed by
right of invention, origination, and/or conquest.
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The force of this argument was gotten from the belief that
the American society was founded upon and fashion from those
things developed from European settlers. DuBois decided
to argue against such argument by claiming that even if it
were valid, it would be invalid, thus not a valid argument.
The argument line which DuBois used against such thought is
found within The Souls of Black Folk . There he argued that
there was little present to the members of American white
society which did not also owe some indebtedness to the
African. This argument first appeared in Atlantic Monthly
,
August 1897, entitled, "Strivings of the Negro People":
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek
and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the
Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with
a veil, and gifted with second-sight in
this American world. . . One ever feels
his twoness, - an American, a Negro; two
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark
body .
^
These statements may have been of interest to a white reader.
On the other hand the meaning gathered by a Black reader
was striking. To the Black reader DuBois argued that the
os. n c^v 'A
reason why the Black reader was anger, and anxious, through-
out much of his life was that the American white society had
attempted to divide that reader. The division was brought
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about by the white society not wanting the African as an
African but rather as that society determined the position
and place the African was to occupy. In that attempt the
Black had become a person who retained part of the person
he would naturally be but could not be within the society,
and there was a part that the white society had attempted
to force upon the African which the African could never be.
Thus the anxiety and anger stemmed from the fact that the
Black American could not be that which the white American
desired. The Black American could only be a participant
within American society in which he shared an equal oppor-
tunity to participate.
The history of the American Negro is the
history of this strife, - this longing to
attain self conscious manhood, to merge his
double self into a better and truer self.
In this merging he wishes neither of the
older selves to be lost. He would not
Africanize America, for America has too
much to teach the world and Africa. He
would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood
of white Americanism, for he knows that
Negro blood has a message for the world.
He simply wishes to make it possible for
a man to be both a Negro and an American,
without being cursed and spit upon by his
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fellows, without having the doors of
Opportunity closed roughly in his face. 7
In 1897 many Blacks who read those lines had experienced
that anxiety described. Never before had they been told
from what or why the anxiety and anger stemmed. These
passages also suggest that DuBois had a related interest
at issue here, a concern for the 'mental health' of the
people. DuBois here addressed that process of thought
which presented the emotions to the consciousness. The
Black reader was asked to recall personal experiences and
events of anger; anger in response to the insults endured
daily. The anger a Black experienced when called "nigger"
was an anger which sprung from the understanding that there
was no such thing as a "nigger" as conceived in a racist
society. What an American Black was, was not a "nigger".
What the Black American sought rightly to achieve, to be a
sharing partner within American society, was not a "nigger".
Only that image which American white society had tried to
force upon the African, as perceived by the white American,
was a "nigger". The anger which the Black experienced
promised only to continue. And so The Souls of Black Folk
spoke eloquently to a white audience as it also spoke force-
fully to a Black audience. Before the white audience, Du-
Bois presented factual material which displayed evidence
of the anger which existed. Before the Black audience DuBois
presented material which demanded more than casual reading.
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"I pray you receive my little book in all charity, studying
my words with me
, . . and seeking the grain of truth hid-
den there ." 8 (Forethought) Within The Souls of Black Folk
DuBois argued that Blacks did not threaten the cultural
institutions of American white society. Within The Souls
of Black Folk DuBois argued when, and only when, the Negro
was recognized as an equal participant within the institu-
tions of American society would American society be truly
realized. In the following DuBois first begins by des-
cribing the importance and the gift of "The Sorrow Songs",
i.e. Negro spirituals; he then moves on to argue that the
Sorrow Song was not the only gift given by the Negro to
developing nation. But because those other gifts are taken
for granted, the injustices perpetrated against the Negro
are allowed to continue:
. . .
Though all the sorrow of the Sorrow
Songs there breathes a hope— a faith in the
ultimate justice of things ... Do the Sorrow
Songs sing true?
The silently growing assumption of this
age is that the probation of races is past, and
that the backward races of today are of proven
inef fiency and not worth the saving . Such an
assumption is the arrogance of peoples ir-
reverent toward Time and ignorant of the deeds
of men. A thousand years ago such an assumption,
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easily possible, would have made it dif-
ficult for the Teuton to prove his right
to life. Two thousand years ago such dog-
matism, readily welcome, would have scouted
the idea of blood races ever leading civil-
izations. So woefully unorganized is socio-
logical knowledge that the meaning of pro-
gress, the meaning of "swift" and "slow" in
human doing, and the limits of human per-
fectability, are veiled, unanswered sphinxes
on the shores of science. Why should
Aeschylus have sung two thousand years before
Shakespeare was born? Why has civilization
flourished in Europe, and flickered, flamed,
and died in Africa? So long as the world
stands meekly dumb before such questions,
shall this nation proclaim its ignorance
and unhallowed prejudices by denying free-
dom of opportunity to those who brought the
Sorrow Songs to the Seats of the Mighty?
Your country? How came it yours? Be-
fore the Pilgrims landed we were here.
Here we have brought our three gifts and
mingled them with yours; a gift of story
and song— soft, stirring melody in an
ill-harmonized and unmelodious land; the
gift of sweat and brawn to beat back the
wilderness, conquer the soil, and lay the
foundations of this vast economic empire
two hundred years earlier than your weak
hands could have done it; the third, a
gift of the Spirit. Around us the history
of the land has centered for thrice a
hundred years; out of the nation's heart
we have called all that was best to
throttle and subdue all that was worst;
fire and blood, prayer and sacrifice,
have billowed over this people, and they
have found peace only the the altars of
the God of Right. Nor has our gift of the
Spirit been merely passive. Actively we
have woven ourselves with the very warp
and woof of this nation,—we fought their
battles, shared their sorrow, mingled our
blood with theirs, and generation after
generation have pleaded with a headstrong,
careless people to despise not Justice,
Mercy, and Truth, lest the nation be
smitten with a curse. Our song, our toil,
our cheer, and warning have been given to
this nation in blood-brotherhood. Are not
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these gifts worth the giving? Is not this
work and striving? Would America have been
America without her Negro people?
LAST WORD
During the years 1965-1970 a body of American students,
whose number has yet to be determined, experienced trauma
on their college campuses. The cause of the trauma was
American society’s institutions of higher learning reacting
badly when they attempted to confront full-face the problem
of the color-line which existed within them. Just as the
effects of exposure to doses of radiation larger than 50
REMS will measurably affect a human in time, so have the
effects of the traumatic collegiate experience taken time
to show. Some of the students of the sixties, who read Du-
Bois, are beginning to show the benefit from the study of
those same lessons now in the eighties. However, the
interest which this Master’s Thesis has addressed is not
that the lessons gathered from DuBois' sociological studies
remain to be learned and applied, though this is true. The
interest rather has been in the philosophical manner DuBois
chose to present those lessons. This, I have argued, was
not done by chance nor coincidence but, rather, was an ex
pression of a disciplined process of thought one might ex-
pect of a trained nineteenth century philosopher.
An example of a lesson offered by DuBois which bears
upon discussions and research presently being carried on,
and is also philosophic food for thought, is found in a
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March 1928, CRISIS . DuBois had received a "Letter to the
Editor" which complained of the CRISIS’ constant use of the
word "Negro". The letter further voiced a hope that the
use of the word "Negro", i.e. to designate Americans of
African descent, would one day be abolished. DuBois answered
the letter with:
My dear Roland:
Do not at the outset of your career make
the all to common error of mistaking names
for things. Names are only conventional
signs for identifying things. Things are
the reality that counts. . . . Moreover,
you cannot change the name of a thing at
will. Names are not merely matters of
thought and reason; they are growths and
habits. . . .
The point DuBois makes, and the lesson which is being offered
as concerns the word "Negro", is that it is not a person of
some skin color that the name picks out. "Negro" is a thing
of reality, a thing of history, a thing whose history should
be appreciated. The word "Negro", and that thing which it
designates, shares of truth and reality as do the words
"Caucasian", "Anglo-Saxon", "Mongol", "German", and so on.
However, the recently designed tests and expressed attitudes,
which argue that there are differences between things desig-
nated by these words, are predicated on the assumption that
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the tests' results and the statements which offer support to
some accepted attitude can be generalized. The target of
the generalization of the tests' results and attitudinal
expressions, in some cases, is a group of people who sup-
posedly share similar skin color and thus similar mental
apti tudinal traits. An argument such as this, DuBois claims,
is an argument of racism.
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